Dos and don’ts in response priming research by Schmidt, Filipp et al.
AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology MethodologicAl Article
http://www.ac-psych.org 2011 • volume 7 (special issue) • 120-131 120
Dos and don’ts 
in response priming research
Filipp Schmidt, Anke Haberkamp, and Thomas Schmidt
Faculty of social sciences, Psychology i, University of Kaiserslautern, germany
response priming, 
unconscious perception, 
research methods
response priming is a well-understood but sparsely employed paradigm in cognitive science.  
the method is powerful and well-suited for exploring early visuomotor processing in a wide range 
of tasks and research fields. Moreover, response priming can be dissociated from visual awareness, 
possibly because it is based on the first sweep of feedforward processing of primes and targets. 
this makes it a theoretically interesting device for separating conscious and unconscious vision. 
We discuss the major opportunities of the paradigm and give specific recommendations (e.g., trac-
ing the time-course of priming in parametric experiments). Also, we point out typical confounds, 
design flaws, and data processing artifacts.
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An invitAtion to response priming
Even in a creative and prolific field like cognitive psychology, new para-
digms are rare. Some are hailed as new but then recognized as variants 
of older ones, and only a few stand the test of time. Ideally, a new experi-
mental paradigm allows researchers to investigate new phenomena not 
covered by previous paradigms, to address old questions from a different 
angle, and to apply new methods and insights to other domains. In vi-
sion science, one such paradigm is response priming (Klotz & Neumann, 
1999; Klotz & Wolff, 1995; Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, & 
Schwarzbach, 2003). Emerging from the classical field of masked prim-
ing and unconscious perception, response priming has matured into a 
paradigm that can be used to investigate visual motor control, visual at-
tention, and a hitherto unrecognized set of dissociations between rapid 
motor activation and visual awareness. In this paper, we will argue that 
response priming is a powerful and innovative tool for investigating is-
sues of early information processing in a broad range of different fields 
(Schmidt et al., 2011).
Response priming refers to a situation in which a participant is react-
ing to a target stimulus as quickly and accurately as possible. The target 
is preceded by a prime stimulus which is either mapped to the same re-
sponse as the target (consistent prime) or to the alternative response (in-
consistent prime, see Figure 1).1 Typically, consistent primes will speed 
and inconsistent primes will slow responses to the target, leading to prim-
ing effects usually defined as the response time difference between con-
sistent and inconsistent trials. If prime and target presentations follow 
each other at stimulus-onset asynchronies (SOAs) shorter than about 
100 ms, the resulting priming function (the priming effect as a function 
of prime-target SOA) follows a prototypical pattern where priming ef-
fects increase approximately linearly with SOA (Figure 2, left panel; cf. 
Vorberg et al., 2003).
Generally, response priming effects occur because the prime acti-
vates the response assigned to it. This has been shown early on in the 
time course of lateralized readiness potentials. These represent relative 
increases in EEG negativity over the motor cortices prior to response 
execution. They are stronger over the motor cortex contralateral to 
the responding hand, and hence the difference potential between the 
left and right hemispheres can be used as a measure of the selective 
preparation of a right-hand or left-hand response. Typically, the poten-
tials start out time-locked to the prime, first develop in the direction 
specified by the prime, and only later proceed in the direction specified 
by the actual target (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; Klotz, Heumann, AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology MethodologicAl Article
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Figure 1.
trial in a typical response priming experiment. Primes and targets are squares or diamonds. Participants respond as quickly and ac-
curately as possible to the contour of the target (e.g., square – right button, diamond – left button). Primes and targets appear at the 
same position either below or above the fixation point and can have the same shape (consistent trial) or different shapes (inconsistent 
trial, shown here). Primes are always presented for 12 ms, only the time interval between prime and target presentation is systemati-
cally varied. note that targets serve as metacontrast masks for the primes.
Figure 2.
typical time course of response priming effects (fictitious data). consistent primes (dark gray) accelerate response times, inconsistent 
primes (light gray) decelerate them. At the same time, consistent primes only rarely lead to response errors, while error rates can be 
very high in inconsistent trials. For both response times and error rates, priming effects (differences between consistent and inconsis-
tent trials) typically increase with soA despite visual masking by the targets.
Response time to the shape 
of the target (ms)
Error probability to the shape 
of the target (%)
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Ansorge, & Neumann, 2007; Leuthold & Kopp, 1998; Vath & Schmidt, 
2007). Such data suggest that the prime activates a response assigned 
to it, and has more time to drive the response on its own the more 
time elapses between prime and target. Therefore, priming effects in-
crease with prime-target SOA (for a mathematical model, see Vorberg 
et al., 2003). Similarly, priming effects in pointing responses make it 
possible to trace the prime’s motor impact in the temporal as well as 
the spatial domain. Experiments that measured pointing movements 
show that inconsistent primes are not only able to delay the responses, 
but also to mislead them in the wrong direction. This diverting influ-
ence can lead to an initial finger movement towards the prime that 
only later reverses in direction of the correct target position (Schmidt, 
2002; Schmidt, Niehaus, & Nagel, 2006; Schmidt & Schmidt, 2009). In 
many cases, response activation by an inconsistent prime can result in 
a full-fledged movement towards the prime position (i.e., a response 
error). This results in a characteristic pattern of error probabilities (cf. 
Figure 2, right panel). Therefore, error rates are of interest for at least 
two reasons. Firstly, they indicate response activation by the prime, just 
like the response time effects. Secondly, it is reasonable to assume that 
errors in inconsistent conditions are predominantly driven by prime 
information (e.g., Schmidt et al., 2006; Schmidt & Schmidt, 2010a). As 
a result, priming effects in error rates are of similar importance as the 
response time effects and should be analyzed just as carefully. In sum, 
it is the close connection between priming effects and online motor 
control that distinguishes response priming from other types of prim-
ing effects.2
A fascinating feature of response priming is its independence of 
visual awareness. The relationship between both can be investigated 
by  combining  response  priming  with  methods  of  visual  masking: 
If primes are rendered invisible by presentation of another stimulus 
in  close  temporal  proximity  (the  mask),  priming  effects  typically 
remain  unchanged.  By  using  metacontrast  masking ( Breitmeyer  & 
Öğmen, 2006), a form of masking that we will describe later, response 
time  effects  and  visual  awareness  can  even  be  double-dissociated: 
When  the  visibility  of  the  primes  decreases,  priming  effects  can 
still  increase  (Albrecht,  Klapötke,  &  Mattler,  2010;  Mattler,  2003b; 
Vorberg et al., 2003). Thus, for a short time and under suitable ex-
perimental  conditions,  visually  masked  stimuli  can  influence  mo-
tor  responses  just  as  effectively  as  clearly  perceivable  stimuli.  This 
independence  of  visual  awareness  and  motor  activation  makes 
response priming a particularly useful tool in studying early visual 
processing.
How can this independence be explained? Lamme and Roelfsema 
(2000; see also Lamme, 2010) propose that a novel stimulus elicits a 
wave of neuronal feedforward activation (feedforward sweep) rushing 
through the visuomotor system: Each cell passes activation on to cells 
downstream before integrating any feedback or recurrent information 
from other cells about the signal (also see Bullier, 2001; Thorpe, Fize, & 
Marlot, 1996; VanRullen & Koch, 2003). Consequently, the wavefront 
of visually elicited activation is essentially devoid of information from 
recurrent processing, which develops only in the wake of the wave. The 
authors suppose that such a feedforward sweep could lead to various 
sorts of priming processes, but not to visual awareness of the critical 
stimulus, which is assumed by many authors to depend on recurrent 
processing (e.g., Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; DiLollo, Enns, & Rensink, 
2000; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000). Applied to response priming, this 
theory can explain why response priming effects remain intact under 
visual backward masking of the prime: Because backward masking 
works through disruption of recurrent processing (cf. DiLollo, Enns, & 
Rensink, 2000; Fahrenfort, Scholte, & Lamme, 2007; Lamme, Zipser, & 
Spekreijse, 2002), it does not affect response priming effects resulting 
from feedforward activation. Evidence that response priming is based 
on feedforward processes comes from the previously mentioned stu- 
dies  of  primed  pointing  movements  and  lateralized  readiness  po-
tentials.  These  studies  show  that  the  earliest  processes  of  response 
activation  are  determined  exclusively  by  prime  information  but 
are independent of all target information, and that only later pro-
cesses  of  response  activation  are  influenced  by  the  actual  target 
(Klotz et al., 2007; Schmidt et al., 2006; Schmidt & Schmidt, 2009; 
Vath & Schmidt, 2007). Therefore, prime and target control the re-
sponse in strict sequence, just as expected of a simple feedforward 
system.
Response priming effects are among the numerically largest ef-
fects in response time research; they can account for 25% or more 
of the overall response time. Therefore, the method is well suited for 
extensive variation of task set and stimuli. For example, it has been 
applied to investigate such different research areas as chess expertise 
(Kiesel, Kunde, Pohl, Berner, & Hoffmann, 2009) or the processing 
of  natural  images  (Schmidt  &  Schmidt,  2009).  Moreover,  priming 
effects are not only found in keypress responses, in speeded finger 
pointing (e.g., Schmidt, 2002), and in electroencephalographic mea-
sures (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; Jaśkowski, Białuńska, Tomanek, 
& Verleger, 2008; Klotz et al., 2007; Leuthold & Kopp, 1998; Vath & 
Schmidt,  2007),  but  also  in  speech  responses  (Ansorge,  Klotz,  & 
Neumann, 1998) and in eye movements (Schwarzbach & Vorberg, 
2006), which can all be used to trace the time-course of motor acti-
vation  by  primes  and  targets.  In  the  same  vein,  response  priming 
effects  can  be  assessed  by  brain  imaging  methods  like  functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; cf. Dehaene et al., 1998; Naccache 
& Dehaene, 2001).
Our intention here is to give an introduction to methodological 
issues involved in response priming. We will discuss the most signifi-
cant modulating variables and give some guidelines about paramet-
ric experimentation. Our goal is to ensure that researchers new to 
the paradigm can make full use of its temporal dynamics and avoid 
important confounds. We will also consider some potential pitfalls 
and possible misconceptions that may help avoid some of the less 
obvious mistakes in setting up experiments and analyzing the data. 
In the end, everything will be condensed into a non-comprehensive 
list of “Dos and Don’ts” which we hope will be helpful to newcomers 
to the field. It shouldn’t be observed too dogmatically: Even though 
it is wise to avoid certain mistakes and artifacts, in some situations 
it  will  be  of  theoretical  interest  to  systematically  go  against  those 
recommendations.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology MethodologicAl Article
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Utilizing the time-coUrses                 
of mAsking And priming
The power of parametric variations 
Usually, response priming effects (in response times and error rates) 
are numerically large compared to other effects in response time re-
search, and pretty stable across individuals, so that reliable results can 
be obtained from comparatively small samples. This makes response 
priming well suited for parametric variation of the independent va-
riables, and in fact the paradigm unfolds its true power only in para-
metric experiments.
Here, we would like to argue for a more frequent use of parametric 
experiments in response priming research but also in cognitive science 
in general. Firstly, parametric experiments allow for the examination 
of a dynamical range of effects. If a researcher is not sampling enough 
levels of an independent variable or levels that are too similar, the 
true functional relationship with the dependent variable may be over-
looked. For example, dose-response studies in medicine can be used to 
determine how much of some medication is needed to have a sufficient 
effect. Similarly, knowing how response priming effects increase with 
prime-target SOA will help find suitable conditions for obtaining large 
effects.  Secondly,  only  parametric  variation  can  reveal  unexpected 
nonlinearities (e.g., a change of sign in the dependent variable). This is 
of special importance when the effect of interest is not well known yet. 
For example, not any amount of some medicine is normally yielding 
positive effects, but may act benevolently or malevolently depending 
on the actual dose (similarly, as discussed below, response priming ef-
fects can be qualitatively different for different ranges of prime-target 
SOA).  Thirdly,  parametric  variation  naturally  achieves  an  internal 
cross-validation of an effect. Even if the effect is strongly modulated 
across experimental conditions, its basic pattern normally repeats at 
most levels of the independent variable, allowing for an evaluation of 
the reliability of an effect within a single experiment.3
The time-course of response 
priming 
The  most  prominent  and  influential  variable  in  response  priming 
experiments is the SOA, that is, the time interval between prime and 
target onset (tightly linked to the interstimulus interval, ISI, which is 
defined as the time between the offset of the prime and the onset of the 
target – consequently, it equals SOA minus prime duration). We have 
already seen that response priming effects strongly increase with SOA: 
The longer the prime signal can control the motor response before the 
target signal does, the stronger the prime’s influence on the output va-
riables (Figure 2). This way, even very shortly presented primes can 
exert a large influence on a subsequent response, but only as a function 
of the time that is available before the target captures motor control 
(Vorberg et al., 2003).
Varying the SOA offers the opportunity to study the time course 
of rapid visuomotor processing in detail. Different sorts of stimuli 
and different phenomena of visual processing (e.g., visual attention, 
perceptual grouping, stimulus contrast) may be characterized by their 
specific influence on the time course of response priming. For example, 
if participants are responding to primes and targets that are based on 
perceptual grouping, strong perceptual grouping allows for a steeper 
priming function than weaker grouping. This way, different grouping 
principles can be compared with respect to their visuomotor process-
ing dynamics (Schmidt & Schmidt, 2010b). Similarly, visual attention 
to locations or features can steepen the slope of the priming function 
(Schmidt & Schmidt, 2010a; Schmidt & Seydell, 2008), just like low-
level stimulus variables such as color saturation do (Schmidt et al., 
2006). Without variation of the SOA, crucial information about the 
slope of the priming function is missed.4
Knowing the entire priming function is crucial for understanding 
nonlinearities in the priming effect. A case in point is what can happen 
if three stimuli are employed (prime, mask, and target) and the prime-
target SOA exceeds 100 ms. For these long SOAs, the size of the prim-
ing effect may further increase, but, under specific conditions, may also 
switch sign (so that participants are responding faster in inconsistent 
trials than in consistent trials). This reverse priming is often called the 
negative compatibility effect (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998, 2003). The 
exact conditions under which this reversal occurs are still debated, and 
several theories compete to explain the effect (see Sumner, 2007, for a 
review). If nonlinearities such as the negative compatibility effect are 
not taken into account, comparisons of priming effects at only a single 
SOA level can be wildly misleading. For instance, if a priming effect 
in condition A is positive while the effect in condition B is negative, 
this can either be due to qualitative processing differences between 
the conditions or to the fact that a positive-to-negative time-course is 
present in both conditions but captured in different states of develop-
ment (Lingnau & Vorberg, 2005). Sampling entire priming functions 
in both conditions would resolve the ambiguity.
The systematic variation of SOA is inevitably accompanied by a 
large number of experimental conditions, at least compared to stan-
dard experiments in cognitive science. Nevertheless, we believe that 
it is absolutely necessary to thoroughly understand the time course 
of any effect studied, and to compare entire priming functions from 
different conditions. Our recommendation is that in every response 
priming experiment, the SOA should be varied in at least three steps, 
covering the whole time range of interest (e.g., from 0 to 100 ms). To 
produce reliable data patterns with relatively small standard errors, 
around 60 trials per condition and participant has turned out to be a 
reasonable number that also makes it possible to evaluate entire data 
patterns in single participants.
Double-dissociated time-courses 
of priming and awareness 
As argued above, an outstanding feature of response priming is its 
capability  to  explore  dissociations  between  rapid  motor  activation 
by the primes and visual awareness of them. This can be achieved by 
contrasting response priming effects or other indicators of processing 
speed with measures where participants report the final outcome of 
processing in visual awareness. The most common method to syste- AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology MethodologicAl Article
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matically control prime visibility is to present a masking stimulus either 
at the same time (simultaneous masking), shortly before (forward mask-
ing), or after prime presentation (backward masking; see Breitmeyer & 
Ögmen, 2006). This can be achieved either by letting the target itself act 
as a masking stimulus for the prime (two-stimulus sequence of prime 
and mask/target) or by introducing the mask as an additional stimulus 
(three-stimulus sequence of prime, mask, and target). A type of mask-
ing often used in response priming studies is metacontrast, a form of 
backward masking in which the inner contours of a hollow masking 
stimulus are bordering the outer contours of the previously presented 
prime (cf. Figure 1). The amount of masking (or prime visibility) is 
measured by administration of a prime identification task, in which the 
participant is asked to detect, identify, or categorize the prime, or to 
indicate its subjective visibility. While the prime identification task is 
considered a direct measure of visual awareness of the prime, the prim-
ing effect can be viewed as an indirect measure of prime processing 
(Reingold & Merikle, 1988).
In general, different kinds of masks lead to different masking func-
tions, which describe masking as a function of prime-mask SOA (Figu-
re 3). The most prominent masking functions are type-A and type-B 
masking. In type-A masking, prime visibility is lowest at short prime-
mask SOAs and increases with increasing SOA (Figure 3, right panel). 
While type-A masking is the most commonly observed masking func-
tion, type-B masking occurs under specific circumstances in metacon-
trast masking. Here, visibility is lowest at medium SOAs (often, around 
50 ms) and higher at shorter or longer SOAs (Figure 3, right panel). 
In both type-A and type-B masking, the strength and time-course of 
masking depend on a number of factors, including stimulus attributes 
of primes and masks (e.g., energy and saturation), prime-mask SOA, 
crowding by irrelevant distractor stimuli, and marked individual dif-
ferences (Albrecht et al., 2010; Breitmeyer & Ögmen, 2006; Schmidt 
& Schmidt, 2010a). As a result, it is possible to produce a variety of 
qualitatively different masking functions if parameters are carefully 
adjusted.
As argued above, response priming and masking can have quali-
tatively different time-courses, which can be assessed by varying the 
prime-target SOA and by comparing the resulting priming and mask-
ing functions. Interestingly, the time-courses of priming and prime 
visibility can form a double dissociation where both variables develop 
in opposite directions (Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006; also see Merikle & 
Joordens, 1997a, 1997b). For instance, if response priming is combined 
with type-B masking, there will be a range of prime-mask SOAs that 
lead to decreasing visibility of the prime yet increasing priming effects. 
Under  very  mild  measurement  assumptions,  double  dissociations 
imply that priming and awareness cannot both be driven by a single 
source of conscious information, thus refuting the idea that priming 
Figure 3.
typical patterns of backward masking (fictitious data). the proportion of correctly identified primes depends on the strength of mask-
ing. Without masking, the prime is correctly identified in virtually 100% of trials (dark gray, left panel), while identification performance 
at chance level (50%, light gray, left panel) would indicate complete masking. depending on mask type, other time courses can be 
achieved (right panel). Under type-A masking, masking is strongest when prime and target follow each other in rapid succession and 
becomes weaker with increasing soA (dark gray, right panel). in type-B masking, masking is strong at intermediate soAs around 50 ms 
and weaker at shorter or longer soAs (light gray, left panel). type-B masking occurs under specific stimulus conditions in metacontrast 
masking.
Prime-target SOA (ms)
Proportion of correctly 
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effects may simply measure residual conscious information about the 
prime not detected by the prime identification task (see Schmidt & 
Vorberg, 2006, for mathematical proofs).
In  this  way,  double-dissociations  overcome  the  problem  of  the 
traditional zero sensitivity criterion, which demands that priming ef-
fects must be demonstrated under conditions where sensitivity to the 
prime is exactly zero (i.e., when the prime is “invisible”). This criterion 
is seemingly strict but implies strong measurement assumptions which 
are not required for double dissociations (most critically, it requires 
an exhaustive measure of visual awareness which is guaranteed to 
never miss a change in visual awareness, however tiny; cf. Reingold & 
Merikle, 1988). In fact, the common preconception of many research-
ers (and many reviewers) that masked priming experiments require 
zero sensitivity for the prime is a fallacy, because double dissociations 
are invariably more informative, more powerful, and less assumption-
ridden.5
Importantly, double dissociations are not confined to metacon-
trast masking, or even to masking in general. For example, Schmidt 
et al. (2010) reported a double dissociation between priming effects 
and the subjective appearance of the prime in a visual brightness illu-
sion, showing that under specific circumstances one prime may look 
brighter than the other but prime responses as if it was darker (and 
vice versa). This dissociation was achieved without any masking, with 
all stimuli clearly visible.
things thAt cAn go wrong
Response priming is a powerful method with numerous applications. 
However, there are pitfalls that should be avoided when applying the 
method.
Degrading the prime signal 
During  most  of  the  history  of  unconscious  perception,  the  zero- 
sensitivity criterion seemed to be the only way to investigate percep-
tion without awareness. In order to decrease the visibility of the prime, 
many  researchers  resorted  to  decreasing  its  stimulus  energy  (e.g., 
intensity, contrast, color saturation, or duration) until prime identifica-
tion performance fell below some strict threshold. However, degrading 
the prime signal means diminishing the priming effect: Since response 
priming increases with increasing prime energy (e.g., Schmidt et al., 
2006), any strong reduction in prime signal strength will abolish the 
priming effect. In other words, in any design which modifies visibility 
by varying the prime, the indirect measures (e.g., priming task) and 
direct measures (e.g., prime identification task) are always confounded. 
As a result, priming effects will increase along with the visibility of the 
prime, erroneously suggesting a strong relationship between response 
priming and visual awareness.
Even more havoc comes from varying the prime’s duration while 
leaving the prime-target ISI constant. This, of course, confounds prime 
duration  and  prime-target  SOA  and  creates  a  spurious  correlation 
between priming and prime visibility by two mechanisms: firstly, by 
confounding  prime  visibility  with  prime  energy  (because  stronger 
prime implies stronger priming), and secondly, by confounding it with 
SOA (because longer SOA implies stronger priming).
Unless variation of the prime is of theoretical interest, it is therefore 
crucial to leave the prime intact and control its visibility by variation 
of mask attributes only (e.g., its stimulus contrast). With higher mask 
energy, visual awareness for the prime should diminish (Breitmeyer 
& Öğmen, 2006). This way, visual awareness can be varied indepen-
dently of prime-mask SOA. We recommend varying prime visibility in 
several steps (at least two) to enable detection of a double dissociation.
Avoiding D-I mismatch 
Any type of dissociation between direct (D) and indirect measures (I) 
depends on a direct comparison of two tasks. Therefore, mismatch of 
direct and indirect tasks should be avoided. Following the recommen-
dations by Schmidt and Vorberg (2006), we strongly recommend that 
direct and indirect tasks be matched with respect to (a) the stimuli,   
(b) the features to be judged, and (c) the assignment of those features to 
motor responses. Ideally, tasks should only differ in whether the prime 
or target is the imperative stimulus.
For example, Schmidt and Schmidt (2009) employed a target iden-
tification task where participants had to decide as quickly as possible 
which of two simultaneously presented target pictures contained an 
animal. Target pictures were preceded by one animal and one non-
animal picture at the same positions as the targets. A matched direct 
task would adopt exactly the same experimental setup but would ask 
for a decision which of the two prime pictures showed an animal. 
Stimuli and stimulus-response mappings would be identical in both 
tasks. Crucially, the direct task would assess precisely the informa-
tion driving the priming effect in the indirect task, namely which of 
the two pictures contained the animal. An example of D-I mismatch 
would be to ask participants to freely report prime picture contents 
instead of performing a forced choice between animal and non-animal 
pictures. Other examples would be to present only one prime and ask 
participants whether or not it contained an animal, or to ask them if a 
prime or no prime was presented (both are detection tasks). In all such 
cases, the direct task loses validity: It becomes impossible to tell what 
performance in the direct task has to say about visual awareness for 
the primes in the indirect task because the type of information driving 
performance in both tasks is not the same.
In some studies, participants are asked to perform direct and indi-
rect tasks in the same trial, for instance, a speeded forced-choice target 
discrimination followed by forced-choice prime discrimination. This 
procedure has the advantage of allowing for trial-by-trial correlations 
between measures. The disadvantage of this method is that it creates a 
dual-task situation where performance in either task may suffer. Dual-
task tradeoffs may also be viewed as a source of D-I mismatch where 
the mismatch arises from uneven splits of attention between both tasks. 
Regarding indirect measures, results from Vorberg et al. (2003) suggest 
that priming effects are not affected by a subsequent (unspeeded) prime 
identification judgment. Regarding direct measures, however, syste-
matic comparisons between the single-task and dual-task approaches AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology MethodologicAl Article
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are still missing. Therefore, we generally recommend administering 
direct and indirect tasks in separate blocks to ensure optimal attention 
to the relevant stimuli.6
In principle, visual awareness of a prime can be measured either by 
subjective or objective methods, depending on the research question 
of interest (Cheesman & Merikle, 1984). For example, participants can 
rate the confidence with which they were able to identify the prime 
(subjectively),  or  they  can  perform  a  forced-choice  discrimination 
between two possible spatial positions of the relevant prime (objec-
tively). One type of measure cannot replace the other, and both give 
potentially interesting information on visual awareness. However, it is 
often difficult to match subjective measures to the indirect measure. 
Therefore, we recommend using subjective measures only in tandem 
with objective measures.
Strategic confounds
In  general,  it  is  advisable  to  intermix  the  different  experimental 
conditions  in  response  priming  experiments.  An  important  excep-
tion are studies where a large range of prime-target SOAs is studied. 
When all SOAs are randomly intermixed and the proportion of long 
SOAs is high, participants will be forced to adjust their response cri-
teria to those long SOAs to avoid response errors. As a result, their 
responses will be delayed, and the hallmark properties of response 
priming  may  not  be  obtained.  The  same  pattern  can  be  observed 
when in some of the trials participants must not respond at all (nogo 
condition; see Klotz et al., 2007). We advise to block short SOAs (say, 
up to 100 ms) and longer SOAs (longer than 100 ms) to avoid such 
confounds.
Dealing with motor properties      
of the masks 
With regard to response priming, it is either possible to let the target 
act as a masking stimulus for the prime (two-stimulus sequence of 
prime and mask/target, see Figure 1) or to introduce the mask as an 
additional stimulus (three-stimulus sequence of prime, mask, and tar-
get). The former approach requires that the particular target stimulus is 
adequate for masking the prime. Of course, it inevitably confounds the 
SOA between prime and mask (which defines the masking function), 
with the SOA between prime and target (which defines the priming 
function); therefore, it might be desirable to vary prime-mask SOA and 
prime-target SOA independently. However, the time-course of motor 
activation in the three-stimulus situation is not well understood, and 
intervening masks seem to be able to interact with primes and targets 
on a motor level. For example, response-relevant masks (masks that 
consist of a superposition of response-relevant prime features) have 
been shown to strongly affect negative compatibility effects (Jaśkowski, 
2008; Jaśkowski  et  al.,  2008; Verleger, Jaśkowski, Aydemir, van der 
Lubbe, & Groen, 2004). If influences of the mask on the priming ef-
fect are to be avoided, masks should not be response-relevant them-
selves, that is, they should not possess properties of the prime or target 
stimuli that would potentially induce a motor response by themselves. 
Unwanted motor effects from the mask seem to be especially large if 
the mask closely follows the prime, that is, occurs early in the prime-
target interval.7
Spatial confounds
A major advantage of the response priming paradigm is the possible 
variety in number and spatial arrangement of the stimuli employed. 
Specifically, one or several prime and target stimuli may either be 
presented at the same location or at different locations (e.g., the prime 
below and the target above fixation, two primes flanked by two tar-
gets, two targets flanked by two primes, etc.). For instance, Schmidt 
and  Seydell  (2008)  and  Schmidt  and  Schmidt  (2010a) employed a 
paradigm in which 10 primes were followed by 10 targets at the same 
positions, and Schmidt and Schmidt (2010b) presented two primes 
that were subsequently flanked on the left and right by two targets. 
Although number and spatial arrangement of stimuli notably differed, 
the basic patterns of results were typical for those of other response 
priming experiments.8
However,  care  should  be  taken  to  avoid  confounding  response 
priming effects with spatial artifacts. In most situations, it is desirable 
that spatial compatibility effects be avoided (e.g., by not presenting 
primes and targets to the left and right of fixation when key responses 
are also left and right, by counterbalancing all experimental condi-
tions across sessions and participants, and by randomizing all stimulus 
positions). A strategy especially suitable for avoiding spatial artifacts 
is  to  let  participants  choose  between  two  targets  preceded  by  two 
primes, with prime positions either spatially consistent or inconsis- 
tent  (switched)  with  respect  to  target  positions.  For  example, 
Schmidt and Schmidt (2009) asked participants to decide which of 
two target images contained an animal, with an animal and a non-
animal prime presented at the same two locations. Compared to the 
single-prime-single-target  situation,  this  procedure  turns  a  yes-no 
decision task into a two-alternative forced-choice task (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005) where the response is always directed by the spatial 
position of the relevant target, and spatial compatibility effects are 
neutralized.
It  has  been  shown  that  spatial  eccentricity  alters  both  the 
magnitude  and  the  time-course  of  response  priming  effects 
(Lingnau  &  Vorberg,  2005).  Therefore,  eye  movements  should 
be  controlled,  and  participants  should  be  instructed  to  keep  fixa-
tion during the entire trial. In our opinion, it is not strictly neces-
sary  to  use  an  eye-tracking  device  to  control  for  eye  movements: 
A sufficient technique is to set up the stimuli in such a way that their 
possible  positions  are  arranged  symmetrically  around  the  fixation 
point. This way, participants are discouraged from using fixation stra-
tegies because the best strategy is to always look at the fixation point. 
Also, results from spatial pre-cueing tasks suggest that participants 
are capable of maintaining steady fixation with very little eye move-
ments if explicitly asked to (Abrams & Law, 2000; Arrington, Carr, 
Mayer, & Rao, 2000; Thiel, Zilles, & Fink, 2004; Yantis & Jonides, 
1990). Finally, in many response priming experiments, time intervals 
between primes and targets are too brief to permit eye movements 
anyway.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology MethodologicAl Article
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Artifacts in measuring prime 
visibility
Recently, some researchers have adopted the practice of evaluating 
prime visibility separately for each participant and then discarding 
those participants who perform significantly above chance (or meet 
a similar criterion). The implicit assumption is that for the remain-
ing participants, the critical stimulus must be invisible. A variant of 
this practice is to look at a range of confidence judgments of a single 
participant and then to eliminate all trials which indicate some degree 
of visibility, concluding that stimuli in the remaining trials must be 
invisible.
This method suffers both from conceptual and from measurement-
theoretical problems. On the conceptual level, it is guilty of a sam-
pling  fallacy:  Discarding  some  observations  from  the  sample  does 
not change the underlying population on which the sample is based. 
Actually, the practice is analogous to eliminating all the patients from 
a clinical trial that have died from the drug under investigation. On 
the measurement level, the approach is taking observers’ judgments 
that an observation belonged to the lowest visibility category (labeled 
“unaware”) at face value: It is simply assuming that the visibility ratings 
truthfully reflect the actual subjective visibility. This would require two 
assumptions: firstly, that there indeed are internal states of “awareness” 
and “unawareness”, and secondly, that the participants are perfectly 
able to classify those internal states. In reality, however, there will be 
a continuum of internal states, and participants will need to impose 
decision criteria (with unknown response biases) to classify them into 
ratings. Under such a scenario, each rating category must be expected 
to contain misses and false alarms from adjacent categories, and it is 
implausible to assume that the rating procedure will identify a set of 
truthfully “unconscious” trials. Basically, the procedure ignores the 
modern psychophysical view that a participant’s response behavior is 
determined jointly by the subjective visibility of the stimulus, by the 
set of response criteria forming the decision boundaries of the differ-
ent response categories, and by chance factors (Green & Swets, 1966; 
Macmillan & Creelman, 2005).
Sometimes, the question arises whether masking functions should 
be  analyzed  separately  for  consistent  and  inconsistent  trials  (this 
is often suggested by reviewers). Again, the basic problem with this 
approach  becomes  obvious  when  judged  from  the  perspective  of 
signal detection theory: Calculating the sensitivity measure d’ sepa-
rately for consistent and inconsistent trials confounds sensitivity and 
bias. Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, and Schwarzbach (2004) 
show that for the standard signal-detection model assuming identi-
cal normal distributions, d’con = d’ + Δβ while d’incon = d’ − Δβ, where   
Δβ = z(FTarget 1) − z(FTarget 2) is the differential effect (in z units) of the 
targets on the false alarm rates in each target condition. Similar prob-
lems will occur with percent-correct and other sensitivity measures. 
The way to avoid such sensitivity-bias confounds is to follow the stan-
dard recommendation from signal detection theory: Keep conditions 
constant that could affect response bias. One way of doing this is to 
calculate d’ separately not for different consistency conditions, but for 
different target types (Vorberg et al., 2003, 2004).
However, plotting masking functions separately for consistent and 
inconsistent trials can reveal interesting response strategies employed 
by single participants. Such plots typically exhibit strong interactions 
between prime-target consistency and prime-target SOA: Typically, 
identification performance at short SOAs is very high for consistent 
primes and very low (often below chance) for inconsistent primes, 
while the opposite may occur at longer SOAs. When participants are 
asked about their strategies, they frequently report guessing the prime 
by the perceived amount of flicker in the prime-target pair. If flicker 
is weak, observers assume that the prime is consistent with the target 
and respond accordingly; when flicker is strong, they conclude that 
the prime is inconsistent and give the opposite response. However, the 
amount of flicker is in fact driven primarily by the prime-target SOA, 
with more flicker at longer SOAs. As a result, responses reveal a strong 
bias in target direction at short SOAs, but a bias against target direc-
tion at long SOAs (for exemplary data and discussion of this bias, see 
Schmidt, 2000).
Similarly, in metacontrast masking participants may try to identify 
consistent and inconsistent trials by judging the amount of apparent 
motion  between  masked  primes  and  visible  targets  (i.e.,  rotation). 
However, even while participants are able to detect this motion cue in 
a separate task, this performance has been shown to correspond nei-
ther with the participants’ prime identification performance nor with 
the resulting priming effects (Ansorge, Becker, & Breitmeyer, 2009; 
Ansorge, Breitmeyer, & Becker, 2007).
grAnd designs
Response priming is a powerful paradigm that can be employed to 
examine the time-course of visuomotor processing in depth. In our 
opinion, the basic mechanisms of response priming are now reason-
ably well understood and have led to detailed and successful theories 
(e.g.,  the  principle  of  direct  parameter  specification  by  Neumann, 
1990; the action trigger account by Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2003; 
and the rapid-chase theory by Schmidt et al., 2006). Implementation 
is fairly easy as long as researchers avoid the pitfalls discussed in the 
present paper (see Box 1). Because of its dissociability from visual 
awareness, response priming is especially suited for studying the effects 
of prime stimuli on preconscious processing, and possibly processing 
based primarily on a first feedforward sweep of visuomotor informa-
tion processing. The method allows for a wide range of visual stimuli, 
decision  tasks,  dependent  variables,  and  spatial  arrangements,  and 
therefore has high potential to be applied to a wide spectrum of issues 
in cognitive science. Because response priming effects are typically 
large, the method lends itself to parametric experimentation.
In our lab, we have just begun to realize some of the many possible 
applications of the response priming paradigm. So far, we used response 
priming as a method to investigate visual awareness and online motor 
control (e.g., Schmidt, 2002), visual attention (Schmidt & Schmidt, 
2010a; Schmidt & Seydell, 2008), brightness processing (Schmidt et 
al., 2010), and natural image processing (Schmidt & Schmidt, 2009). 
Currently, we are further extending our research interests by using the AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology MethodologicAl Article
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response priming method to investigate such different topics as visual 
processing of transparency, processing advantages of phobic stimuli, 
illusory contours, figure-ground segregation, and perceptual group-
ing (see Schmidt et al., 2011, for some examples). Other labs used the 
method to investigate unconscious color processing (Breitmeyer, Ro, & 
Singhal, 2004), unconscious number processing (Dehaene et al., 1998), 
priming of cognitive control operations (Mattler, 2003b), or the role 
of expertise in unconscious processing in chess players (Kiesel et al., 
2009) or typists (Heinemann, Kiesel, Pohl, & Kunde, 2010).
Accordingly, we think of response priming not primarily as an 
interesting effect in visuomotor processing and cognition, but as an ex-
perimental method that is heavily underestimated and underemployed 
considering its scientific potential. The basic properties of response 
priming − sequential response activation by primes and targets, inde-
pendence of priming from awareness, and possibilities for variation 
− raise the possibility of contrasting the results of early processing (pre-
conscious and presumably based on a feedforward sweep) with those of 
late processing (conscious and based on recurrent processing) for many 
phenomena in human visual cognition (Schmidt et al., 2011). Response 
priming methods can thus complement or even be infused into studies 
in neurophysiology and neuroimaging, especially regarding the poten-
tial for double dissociations between priming and visual awareness. 
Footnotes
1 While we prefer the term consistency to refer to the prime-target 
relationship, the terms congruency and compatibility are also in use. 
Alternative names of the response priming paradigm itself are action 
priming, target priming, and metacontrast dissociation.
2 In particular, response priming can be clearly distinguished from 
semantic priming because it does not require a semantic connection 
between prime and target. While most semantic priming effects are 
probably unrelated to response priming, some types of semantic classi-
fication might be able to activate fast motor responses to produce a se-
mantic response priming effect. Possible examples include the decision 
whether a single-digit number is smaller or larger than 5 (Dehaene et 
al., 1998), decisions which of two target pictures contains an animal 
(Schmidt & Schmidt, 2009), or even chess-players’ decisions whether 
or not the king is in check (Kiesel, Kunde, Pohl, Berner, & Hoffmann, 
2009). We will not discuss semantic priming here but refer to reviews 
by Lucas (2000), by Hutchison (2003), and by van den Bussche, van 
den Noortgate, and Reynvoet (2009).
3 We believe that parametric methods are underused specifically 
in neuroimaging studies, for example, regarding the technique of cor-
relating changes in the blood oxygenation signal to different levels of a 
quantitative independent variable.
4 Note that these modulatory effects of attention do not imply that 
priming is based on cognitive control processes. Instead, visual atten-
tion modulates the priming effect if directed to features or locations 
just in time before prime onset, boosting feedforward processing of 
primes and targets in the upcoming trial (Schmidt & Schmidt, 2010a; 
Schmidt & Seydell, 2008). A similar argument applies to studies show-
ing the mediation of response priming effects by intentional response 
strategies (e.g., Kunde, 2003): Here, top-down control might adjust 
response thresholds in upcoming trials.
5 Specifically, let Ii(ci, ui) and Di(ci, ui) be two measures of visual 
processing in experimental condition i, one indirect (e.g., priming ef-
fect) and one direct (e.g., prime identification performance), such that 
both measures are functions of conscious (c) as well as unconscious 
(u) sources of visual information. A double dissociation is observed 
when for two experimental conditions i and j, Ii(ci, ui) > Ij(cj, uj) while 
Di(ci, ui) < Dj(cj, uj), or vice versa. Schmidt and Vorberg (2006) show 
that  this  data  pattern  implies  nonzero  unconscious  information   
DO DON’T
Vary prime-target SOA in at least three steps to know the time-
course of priming.
Create D-I mismatch.
Compare priming effects by comparing entire priming   
functions.
Masked priming: Vary visibility by changing the prime instead    
of the mask.
Aim at parametric variation of other variables. Confound prime presentation time and SOA.
Analyze response times as well as error rates. Mix very long and very short SOAs.
Employ online measures of motor activation. Use visibility ratings to classify trials or subjects as „unaware”.
Look for double dissociations between priming and awareness. Believe that the zero-awareness criterion is the only way to go.
Masked priming: Be careful with motorically active and early 
masks.
box 1. 
dos and don’ts in response Priming research. AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology MethodologicAl Article
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(u > 0) in at least one condition. Only assumptions of weak monotoni-
city with respect to conscious information need to be made for D and I, 
while the traditional zero-sensitivity criterion (which demands that D 
= 0) requires unrealistically strong assumptions of strict monotonicity.
6 Unfortunately, trial-to-trial correlations between direct and indi-
rect measures are often of limited use. Zero correlations in a single con-
dition do not imply zero correlation across conditions, which are typi-
cally of major interest when prime visibility is varied experimentally. 
Positive correlations may be due to third variables (e.g., fluctuations in 
alertness) and do not allow for assessment of the causal direction of the 
relationship; also, their maximal size is severely restricted by measure-
ment noise. Negative correlations would be interesting but have never 
been reported.
7 Unpublished data from our lab suggest that early masks imme-
diately following the prime can also impede regular response priming 
effects.
8 The classical flanker paradigm by Eriksen and Eriksen (1974) 
might  be  a  special  case  of  the  response  priming  paradigm:  Both 
techniques seem to yield similar results when the same time range is 
studied (cf. Mattler, 2003a; Schwarz & Mecklinger, 1995; Vorberg et al., 
2003). Even in their seminal 1974 paper, Eriksen and Eriksen showed 
that response times were the same for flankers identical to the targets 
and for nonidentical flankers assigned to the same response as the 
target, thus demonstrating flanker effects on a motor rather than on 
a perceptual level.
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